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Abstract. The use of elliptic curves in cryptography relies on the ability
to count the number of points on a given curve. Before 1999, the SEA
algorithm was the only eÆcient method known for random curves. Then
Satoh proposed a new algorithm based on the canonical p-adic lift of
the curve for p  5. In an earlier paper, the authors extended Satoh's
method to the case of characteristics two and three. This paper presents
an implementation of the Satoh-FGH algorithm and its application to the
problem of nding curves suitable for cryptography. By combining Satoh-
FGH and an early-abort strategy based on SEA, we are able to nd secure
random curves in characteristic two in much less time than previously
reported. In particular we can generate curves widely considered to be as
secure as RSA-1024 in less than one minute each on a fast workstation.
1 Introduction
Since elliptic curve cryptosystems were rst proposed in the mid-eighties by
Koblitz [Kob87] and Miller [Mil87], their eÆciency and security have been the
focus of intense study. In recent years, they have become widely accepted as
an alternative to cryptosystems based on factorisation or discrete logarithms in
nite elds, especially for constrained environments.
One of the initial steps in protocols based on elliptic curve cryptography is to
generate a suitable curve dened over a nite eld. To ensure that the system is
secure, the curve must be chosen to have a number of points which is divisible by
a large prime so that computing discrete logarithms on the curve is intractable
using known attacks. Hence it is necessary to know the cardinality of the curve.
Among the elliptic curves dened over a given nite eld, there are some
classes of curves with particular properties that are useful for counting points
or for accelerating arithmetic operations occurring in the protocols. However
choosing such curves can be dangerous.
Perhaps the most striking example is trace 1 curves. The number of points
over F
q
is simply q. However Smart [Sma99], Satoh-Araki [SA98] and Semaev
[Sem98] independently discovered a polynomial-time attack.
Another attack due to Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone [MOV91], and gener-
alised by Frey-Ruck [FR94], reduces discrete logs on supersingular and trace
2 curves to discrete logs in a small-degree extension of F
q
. This yields an algo-
rithm that runs in sub-exponential time.
A minor weakness is known for curves with many automorphisms [vOW99],
[GLV], [DGM99] including curves dened over a small subeld, proposed by
Koblitz, and some complex-multiplication curves. Attacks on these curves take
less time than for generic curves, but remain in exponential time.
It has recently been shown by Gaudry-Hess-Smart [GHS00] that curves de-
ned over composite extension elds are also weak in certain cases, using a
reduction via hyperelliptic curves.
These results suggest that for maximum security one should avoid curves
with special properties and instead choose a random curve whose number of
points is divisible by a large prime, over a prime eld or an extension of prime
degree. This ideal procedure was made possible in practice by the SEA algorithm
due to Schoof [Sch85], [Sch95], Elkies [Elk98], Atkin [Atk92] and others [Cou94]
[Cou96], [Mor95], [Ler97a], [Mul95], [Dew98], etc. With this method, counting
points on one given curve is reasonably fast.
However nding a cryptographically suitable curve requires testing many
curves and this takes much more time. For instance, Johnson andMenezes [JM99]
recently described this process as a \complicated and cumbersome task" requir-
ing \a few hours on a workstation" for 200 bits.
Recently, a new algorithm for counting points on curves in small character-
istic p  5 was designed by Satoh [Sat00] and we extended it to characteristics
two and three in [FGH00]. An independent extension to characteristic two is
described by Skjernaa [Skj].
Satoh's algorithm is asymptotically superior to SEA for xed p, requiring
O(log
3+"
q) deterministic time, instead of O(log
4+"
q) under reasonable hypothe-
ses. As demonstrated in [FGH00], the Satoh-FGH algorithm is much faster in
practice in characteristic two. Indeed we were able to count points over much
larger elds (up to 8009 bits) than had previously been possible, and could match
the largest size reached with SEA (i.e. 1999 bits) in just three hours.
In the following we will describe a method for generating cryptographically
suitable curves, over elds of 113 to 571 bits, using an implementation of the
Satoh-FGH algorithm combined with an eÆcient early-abort strategy based on
ideas from SEA. In this manner we reduce substantially the time required for
curve-generation, nding suitable 200-bit curves in minutes rather than hours
on a workstation, for instance.
In section 2, we recall some basic facts about elliptic curves dened over nite
elds of characteristic two. Next we review some algorithms that can be used
to compute the cardinality of a curve, and in particular we give a description
of the Satoh-FGH algorithm. Section 4 gives the conditions that a curve must
satisfy in order to be suitable for cryptographic applications. It also describes the
early-abort strategy rst used by Lercier in [Ler97a] for selecting good curves.
Last but not least we describe our implementation and the results we obtained by
combining a more aggressive early-abort strategy and the Satoh-FGH algorithm.
2 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields of Characteristic Two
In this section, we recall some basic facts about elliptic curves dened over F
q
where q = 2
d
. We will only be concerned with characteristic two. For more
informations on elliptic curves, the reader can refer to [Men93], [Sil86], [BSS99].
For our purposes, we can choose the equation of an elliptic curve E (with
non-zero j-invariant) to be:
E : y
2
+ xy = x
3
+ a
6
where a
6
2 F

q
.
Its twist curve is:
E

: y
2
+ xy = x
3
+ a
2
x
2
+ a
6
where a
2
is some xed element of trace 1.
An important invariant of the curve is its j-invariant j(E) = 1=a
6
. In the
following we assume j(E) 62 F
4
and in particular that curves are ordinary i.e.,
not supersingular.
The set of points E(F
q
) of the curve is:
E(F
q
) = f(x; y) 2 F
2
q
j (x; y) satises the equation of Eg [ fO
E
g;
where O
E
is the point at innity.
The Frobenius automorphism F is the map x 7! x
q
on F
q
. It can be extended
to an endomorphism of E:
F : E ! E
(x; y) 7! (x
q
; y
q
)
Its characteristic equation is of the form:
F
2
  cF + q = 0:
One can show that the number of points on E is
N = q + 1  c; with jcj  2
p
q
where c is the trace of Frobenius on E. The bound on c is due to Hasse [Has33].
Note that 4 jN since the point (
4
p
a
6
;
p
a
6
) on E has order four. The number of
points on E

is N

= q + 1 + c and one has 2 k N

.
The little Frobenius automorphism  is the map x 7! x
2
. It can be extended
to an isogeny from E to the conjugate curve E

: y
2
+ xy = x
3
+ a
2
6
as follows:
 : E ! E

(x; y) 7! (x
2
; y
2
):
3 Counting the Number of Points
3.1 The Schoof-Elkies-Atkin Algorithm
The rst polynomial-time algorithm for counting points on elliptic curves over
nite elds was described by Schoof in [Sch85]. The basic idea is to nd the trace
of the curve modulo small primes ` by studying the action of F on the `{torsion
part of E. Restricting the characteristic equation of F to the `{torsion results in
(X
q
2
; Y
q
2
)  [q](X;Y ) = [c
`
](X
q
; Y
q
)
for each point (X;Y ), where c
`
 c mod `. This equality can be tested, for
each candidate c
`
2 [0 : : : `  1], by doing polynomial arithmetic modulo the
`{division polynomial. Now, it suÆces to compute c
`
for many small primes `
and then to recover the exact result using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The
time required for point-counting over F
q
with this algorithm is O(log
5+"
q) using
asymptotically fast methods for arithmetic (or O(log
8
q) using nave arithmetic).
The degree of the `{division polynomial is O(`
2
), which grows quickly and causes
this algorithm to be slow in practice.
In large characteristic, Elkies [Elk98] and Atkin [Atk92] improved Schoof's
method yielding the so-called SEA algorithm (see [Sch95]) with run-time re-
duced to O(log
4+"
q) (or O(log
6
q)) under reasonable hypotheses. Their idea is
to construct a factor of degree O(`) of the division polynomial and work with it
instead. Such a factor can be found by factoring the modular polynomial to nd
eigenspaces of the Frobenius endomorphism F restricted to E[`].
Further work by Morain [Mor95] and others led to practical implementations
of SEA for prime elds. Couveignes extended SEA to work in small characteristic
using the formal group [Cou94] or the p-torsion [Cou96] and Lercier found an
eÆcient method for characteristic two [Ler97a].
3.2 The Satoh-FGH Algorithm
Here we present our adaptation of Satoh's algorithm to the case of characteristic
two. The reader can nd more details, including for odd characteristic, in [Sat00]
and [FGH00].
The principal idea of this new algorithm is to lift E to a curve E over a 2{adic
ring Z
q
and to compute the trace of the Frobenius on E .
Canonical Lift of the Curve Just as F
q
is obtained from F
2
by taking an
algebraic extension modulo an irreducible polynomial f(x), one can obtain Z
q
from the 2{adic integers Z
2
by taking an extension modulo a polynomial g(x)
which reduces modulo 2 to f(x). Thus we have Z
q
= Z
2
[x]=(g(x)). We represent
this situation with the following gure.
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A Frobenius morphism F can also be dened on Z
q
. In this case it is not a
simple q-th powering operation but something much more complicated. We do
not dene it explicitly since we will never have to compute it. Similarly, there
exists a little Frobenius morphism . For further details on Z
q
and its Frobenius
maps, see [Ser68].
A theorem of Lubin, Serre and Tate [LST64] guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of a canonical lifted curve E over Z
q
such that End(E) = End(E), via
a canonical lift of the j-invariant. Indeed J = j(E) is characterised by J  j(E)
modulo 2 and 
2
(J;(J)) = 0, where 
2
is the 2{modular polynomial.
A crucial part of Satoh's contribution is an eÆcient algorithm for lifting j-
invariants. Instead of lifting j(E) in isolation, he suggests lifting the whole cycle
of conjugate j's simultaneously. He also proposes considering the duals
^

i
of the
little Frobenius isogenies instead of
i
themselves. Indeed the duals are separable
and hence are determined by their kernel. After having lifted the j-invariants
using Satoh's method, we lift the coeÆcients of the curves and then compute the
kernels by lifting a 2{torsion point on each conjugate curve, using the methods
from [FGH00]. As a result, we compute the following diagram:
E
0


^

0
//
E
1


^

1
//
  
^

d 2
//
E
d 1


^

d 1
//
E
0
E
0
^
0
//
E
1
^
1
//
  
^
d 2
//
E
d 1
^
d 1
//
E
0
Here the top row is over Z
q
to precision O(2
d=2+o(d)
) and  is reduction modulo
2 down to F
q
.
Computing the Trace in Z
q
Since traces are preserved by taking the dual
and by canonical lifting, we have the equation:
Tr(F ) = Tr(
^
F ) = Tr(
^
F):
Moreover
^
F can be written as the composition
^
F =
^

d 1
Æ : : : Æ
^

1
Æ
^

0
:
To nd its trace we go to the formal groups of the curves. In formal groups,
isogenies are represented by power series and composing isogenies is done by
composing the power series. The rst coeÆcient c
1
of the power series of
^
F is
related to its trace as follows:
Tr
^
F = c
1
+
q
c
1
:
Therefore, computing the trace can be done by computing c
1
, and the latter
can be computed by composing all the power series of the
^

i
. Only the rst
coeÆcients g
i
of the
^

i
have to be determined, and this can be done with Velu's
formulae [Vel71]. More precisely, g
2
i
is given by an explicit formula involving the
lifted curves and 2{torsion. Taking one of the square roots of
Q
g
2
i
produces the
trace to suÆcient precision for it to be recovered exactly using Hasse's bound.
3.3 Description of the Algorithm
In this section, we give a synthetic description of the algorithm. For a more
detailed one, we refer the reader to [FGH00]. The general procedure is:
Procedure MainAlgorithm
Input: An elliptic curve E dened over F
q
, with j(E) 62 F
4
.
Output: The trace of the curve.
1. Compute the cycle of d curves E
i
and their j-invariants j
i
.
2. Lift all the j
i
's simultaneously, yielding J
i
.
3. Lift each curve by lifting its a
6
coeÆcient.
4. Lift the kernel of each
^

i
.
5. Compute the trace from the lifted data.
In this procedure, points 2, 3 and 4 concern the lifting of the cycle of curves
and of the kernels. We will detail these rst. An essential ingredient is Newton's
iteration for improving the (2{adic) precision of a root of a function.
Procedure LiftCurvesAnd2Torsion
Input: A cycle of d conjugate curves, and their j-invariants.
Output: The canonical lift of this cycle over Z
q
.
1. Lift the j-invariants simultaneously using an adaptation of the Newton iter-
ation to the multivariate case. The function to be considered acts on a 1 d
vector: (x
0
; : : : ; x
d 1
) = (
2
(x
0
; x
1
); 
2
(x
1
; x
2
);    ; 
2
(x
d 1
; x
0
)) and the
initial approximation of the root is the vector (j
0
; j
1
; : : : ; j
d 1
) modulo 2.
2. Lift each curve E
i
by lifting its a
6
coeÆcient, yielding A
i
, using a Newton
iteration with the function f(x) = 1+ J(x+432x
2
) and the initial approxi-
mation  1=J
i
modulo 16.
3. Lift the 2{torsion point in the kernel of each
^

i
yielding (X
i
; Y
i
) on E
i
, using
a Newton iteration based on the function f(x) = 8x
3
+ x
2
+A
i
with initial
approximation 1=J
i+1
modulo 4.
With these algorithms, one can perform the lifting eÆciently. Once this is
done, it remains to compute the trace of
^
F . The equations in the following
algorithm are derived from Velu's formulae.
Procedure ComputeTrace
Input: A cycle of d curves, given by A
i
, and 2{torsion abscissae X
i
.
Output: The trace of
^
F .
1. Compute the square of the rst coeÆcient of the expansion of each
^

i
in the
formal group of E
i
using Velu's formulae. The result is:
g
2
i
=
1  252X
i
+ 19008A
i
(1 + 120(X
i
+ 6X
2
i
)) (1 + 864A
i+1
)
:
2. Compute c
2
=
Q
g
2
i
.
3. Compute c by computing a square root of c
2
and by determining the sign
using c  1 mod 4.
4 Good Elliptic Curves in Cryptography
The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems depends on the diÆculty of solving
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problem. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, there are several attacks against curves with special properties such
as the one against trace 1 curves, or the MOV reduction for supersingular curves,
etc.
For random curves, the chance that one of these methods can apply is van-
ishingly small. However there are other attacks that work for generic abelian
nite groups.
The rst is Pohlig-Hellman reduction [PH78]. When the group order N has
all its prime factors small, discrete logs can be computed quickly by working in
small subgroups. Thus for good security it is essential to pick a group whose
order is divisible by a large prime.
The other attacks are algorithms that run in time O(
p
N). They include
Shanks' baby-step giant-step algorithm (see [Coh96]) and Pollard's  method
[Pol78]. In practice, the most diÆcult ECDL that has been computed is on a
Koblitz curve over F
2
109
using a distributed version of Pollard{ [Har00].
By extrapolating the work required to larger sizes and allowing safety margins
for future increases in computing power, it is generally believed (see [FIPS186],
[LV00], [P1363], [Sil00]) that a random curve whose order is divisible by a prime
of at least 160 bits will oer reasonable security, comparable to 80-bit symmet-
ric systems or 1024-bit RSA. For applications with the highest security require-
ments, one may take larger safety margins.
To nd a secure curve, Lercier [Ler97a] proposed an early-abort strategy to
use when computing the cardinality of the curve using SEA. The idea is to test
on the y if q + 1   c  0 mod `. If the test is true, then we throw away the
curve and try again with another one. Since SEA computes c mod `, this test
is easy to implement and costs no extra run-time. In large characteristic where
Satoh-FGH does not apply this is still the best known method and we refer to
the existing literature on the subject [LM95], [IKNY98], [MP98].
A diÆculty that arises when designing an early-abort strategy to use with
the Satoh-FGH algorithm is that c mod ` is not available (except for ` a power
of p). Our solution is to implement a simplied version of SEA to determine
whether the curve has a rational point of `-torsion or not for the rst few primes
`, as a preliminary step before launching Satoh-FGH. There is a trade-o to be
made between the extra cost of these calculations and the benet to be gained by
avoiding an entire cardinality computation. In practice we found this strategy to
be very worthwhile and obtained run-times lower than those previously reported
in the literature.
5 Implementation and Results
5.1 Implementation Details
We wrote optimised implementations of the early-abort strategy and the Satoh-
FGH algorithm for characteristic two, in the C programming language. This
implementation of the early-abort strategy is independant of Lercier's one. For
multiplication in F
q
we used Karatsuba's algorithm; in Z
q
we used Toom's al-
gorithm. To ensure that modular reduction took very little time, we chose the
irreducible polynomial to be a trinomial or pentanomial. For division we used
the binary Euclidean algorithm in F
q
, and inversion by Newton iterations in Z
q
.
Most of our timing tests were run on a 750 MHz EV6 Alpha. In order to
compare results with [Ler97a], we also ran some tests on a 266 MHz EV4 Alpha
identical to the one Lercier used. Note that the dierence between these proces-
sors is more than what we could think by just comparing the clock speeds: for
usual applications, the gain is by a factor of about 15. Finally we timed curve
generation for one small eld on a 275 MHz StrongARM chip.
In the early-abort part, as explained below, the most time consuming parts
are lazy factorizations of small-degree polynomials over F
q
. The most frequent
operation is multiplication in F
q
. We give relevant timings obtained on the 750
MHz Alpha in Table 1.
Field size 163 bits 193 bits 239 bits 409 bits 571 bits
Cost of a multiplication in F
q
0.488 s 0.639 s 0.917 s 2.632 s 4.685 s
Table 1. Cost of a multiplication in F
q
on a 750 MHz EV6 Alpha.
The most frequent operation in the point-counting part is multiplication in
Z
q
. In Table 2, we give the time for one such operation at the highest 2{adic
precision required i.e., dd=2e+3 bits, for various eld sizes d. These measurements
were also done on the 750 MHz Alpha.
Base eld size 163 bits 193 bits 239 bits 409 bits 571 bits
Maximal precision 85 100 123 208 289
Cost of a multiplication in Z
q
0.19 ms 0.24 ms 0.36 ms 4.6 ms 8.0 ms
Table 2. Cost of a multiplication in Z
q
on a 750 MHz EV6 Alpha.
Field size SEA (timings from [Ler97b]) Satoh-FGH Ratio
Min Max Avg
155 bits 58.8 s 132 s 86.5 s 36.3 s 2.4
196 bits 212 s 1029 s 308 s 68.8 s 4.5
300 bits 1519 s 3686 s 2434 s 408.4 s 6
Table 3. Times for point-counting on a 266 MHz EV4 Alpha
5.2 Counting the Number of Points on One Curve
When computing the cardinality of a curve, one has to decide whether to use
SEA or Satoh. Two cases have to be dealt with dierently: the case of large
characteristic and the case of small characteristic.
The complexity of Satoh's algorithm has a bad dependency in the character-
istic p of the base eld and when p is large, it is not eÆcient at all. This is due
to the use of the modular equation 
p
for the lifting of the curves. This equation
has O(p
2
) coeÆcients that have to be known at least modulo p
(d=2)+O(1)
. Hence
a complexity which is exponential in p appears to be unavoidable. On the other
hand, the SEA algorithm is polynomial-time independently of p. For instance,
Morain succeeded in counting the number of points of a curve over a eld of size
10
499
+ 153 [Mor95].
However in small characteristic Satoh's algorithm is eÆcient. In particular in
characteristic two, Satoh-FGH is clearly faster than SEA in practice. To illustrate
the dierence in speed between the two algorithms, we compare Lercier's results
[Ler97b] with the timings we get over the same elds, using an identical 266 MHz
Alpha. The results are given in Table 3. We do not give minimal or maximal
times for Satoh-FGH since the runtime of this algorithm is essentially constant
when treating dierent curves over the same eld. These results show that the
bigger the eld the greater the advantage for Satoh-FGH, as expected from the
asymptotics.
We give timings for point-counting on the 750 MHz Alpha in Table 4. Most
of the eld sizes that we chose are recommended in cryptographic standards
(ANSI X9.63, IEEE P1363, IPSec, NIST, WAP).
Remark: In some cases, the SEA and Satoh-FGH algorithms can be combined
to speed-up point-counting. This works particularly well when the eld size is
such that the maximum precision required in Satoh-FGH is a little more than
a multiple of the machine word-size. A good example is q = 2
251
: the maximum
precision in the lifting calculations is d
251
2
e+3 = 129 bits. In this case, computing
Field size Satoh-FGH Field size Satoh-FGH Field size Satoh-FGH
157 bits 2.39 s 197 bits 4.45 s 283 bits 26.5 s
163 bits 2.76 s 233 bits 6.57 s 409 bits 76.3 s
193 bits 4.10 s 239 bits 6.94 s 571 bits 257 s
Table 4. Times for point-counting on a 750 MHz EV6 Alpha
the trace modulo 3 with the SEA algorithm allows the precision to be reduced
to 128 bits which ts perfectly in a whole number of words. This approach could
certainly be pushed further, although implementation complexity would appear
to outweigh the moderate gain in speed.
5.3 Finding a Good Curve
The nave strategy to nd a curve suitable for cryptographic use is to count the
number of points for many curves, until one with almost prime order is found.
As mentioned before, if the SEA algorithm is used then many bad curves can be
detected early; this nice property does not hold for the Satoh-FGH algorithm.
Hence, for small to medium sizes, the nave strategy using Satoh-FGH is not
better than the early-abort strategy with SEA. For instance over F
2
155
, Lercier
[Ler97b] was able to select the good curves among a set of 1000 random ones
in 14112 seconds. On the same computer, the Satoh-FGH method takes 36:5
seconds per curve, so that selecting the good ones would take 36500 seconds
with the naive strategy, and would be worse by a factor 2:5. (For larger sizes,
this phenomenon vanishes and Satoh-FGH is always better.)
To counter this, we take advantage of both methods: we rst eliminate many
candidate curves by an early-abort strategy based on SEA's techniques, and then
run Satoh-FGH on the remaining ones.
Let E be a curve over F
q
. For a small prime `, E is called `-good if its order
is coprime to `, and `-bad otherwise. Early-abort works as follows for each `:
1. Compute the number of roots of 
`
(X; j(E)). It can be 0, 1, 2 or `+1. (The
cases 1 or `+ 1 cannot occur unless q is a square modulo `.)
2. If there are no roots, E is `-good.
3. Otherwise, for each root of 
`
, build the corresponding factor of the `-division
polynomial and search for a root x of the factor. If there is such an x in F
q
and a corresponding y too, then (x; y) is an `-torsion point over F
q
and E is
`-bad.
4. Otherwise E is `-good.
The major cost in step 1 is that of computing X
q
modulo 
`
(X; j(E)), which
has degree ` + 1. To accelerate the calculation, we replace 
`
by the canonical
modular polynomial 
c
`
, which has the same degree but is sparser and involves
lower powers of j. We refer to [Mor95] for the construction and the properties
of these equations.
q = 2
163
q = 2
239
` Root nding Average Root nding Average
of 
c
`
(X; j) total time of 
c
`
(X; j) total time
3 0.17 ms 0.17 ms 0.28 ms 0.28 ms
5 0.34 ms 0.38 ms 0.61 ms 0.68 ms
7 0.34 ms 1.18 ms 0.56 ms 2.18 ms
11 4.42 ms 6.93 ms 9.14 ms 14.1 ms
13 1.07 ms 4.19 ms 1.94 ms 8.36 ms
17 3.71 ms 8.63 ms 7.34 ms 17.9 ms
19 4.97 ms 11.6 ms 10.1 ms 23.7 ms
Table 5. Average runtime for checking if E is `-good (EV6 { 750 MHz)
Heuristically, in half of the cases there will be no root (in such a case ` is
called an Atkin prime) and we are done. Otherwise, we have to continue to step 3.
The factor of the division polynomial corresponding to a root of the modular
polynomial is calculated using a system of formulae due to Lercier [Ler97a]. For
small ` the solution to this system can be written explicitly, and the factor is
obtained at almost no cost. (For larger ` the system could be solved eÆciently by
an algorithm also due to Lercier.) The cost of searching for a root is dominated
by the computation of X
q
modulo the factor, which has degree (`  1)=2.
In Table 5 we give the run-time for this procedure, measured on the 750 MHz
Alpha.
It is necessary to bound the maximum size of ` in order to balance the
cost of early-abort against the gain obtained by avoiding point-counting. In
theory, it would be benecial to increase ` until the above early-abort procedure
took approximately one `-th of the time required for point-counting. Hence the
maximum size of ` would grow with the eld size.
However almost all of the advantage to be gained comes from using the rst
few primes and in practice we found `  19 to be a good trade-o. For these
primes it is not diÆcult to determine if curves are `-good: Lercier's construction
of isogenies is relatively easy, as in the search for `-torsion points. Thus we were
able to keep our code simple and reliable.
For comparison with Lercier's results reported in [Ler97b], we ran some fur-
ther tests on the 266 MHz Alpha. We chose a similar early-abort strategy, search-
ing for good curves with order 4p without considering the twist curves at all (but
see below). The results can be found in Table 6. As a rst step in the early-abort,
we determine whether the order is divisible by 8. This can be decided very quickly
by computing Tra
6
. Note that we measured our timings for 157 and 197 bits in-
stead of 155 and 196 because composite extension elds may be weak in certain
cases, as mentioned in the introduction.
Next, in order to maximise the performance of curve generation we decided to
search simultaneously for twist curves with order 2p and this allowed us roughly
to double the speed. As is clear from section 2, the cardinality of the twist can
be found immediately from that of the curve itself. Furthermore, the early-abort
Field size SEA (from [Ler97b]) Satoh-FGH + early-abort
155 bits 14112 s 4490 s
196 bits 30254 s 7850 s
Table 6. Time to select good curves among 1000 (EV4 { 266 MHz)
Field size Time for e.-a. Remaining Time to count Good Average time to
(in bits) on 10000 curves curves remaining curves curves nd a good curve
157 21.1 s 435 17.3 min 45 23.6 s
163 23.1 s 473 21.7 min 55 24.1 s
193 25.1 s 402 27.5 min 33 50.7 s
197 30.8 s 415 30.8 min 43 43.6 s
233 40.3 s 402 44 min 29 92,4 s
239 43.5 s 435 50.3 min 29 105.6 s
283 122 s 418 3h 4 min 20 9.2 min
409 245 s 467 9h 54 min 22 27 min
571 524 s 375 26h 40 min 11 146 min
Table 7. Average time to nd a good curve (EV6 { 750 MHz)
strategy can easily be adapted to take the twist into account since it has the same
j-invariant and the same division polynomials. (This is because the curve and
its twist are isomorphic over an algebraic closure and the isomorphism preserves
the abscissae.)
One possibility would be to reject a pair consisting of a curve and its twist
only when the early-abort strategy determines that both curves are cryptograph-
ically unsuitable. Alternatively one may pursue a more aggressive strategy by
rejecting them both as soon as either one is found to be unsuitable, and immedi-
ately moving on to a new pair. Using the latter method for 10000 random curve
pairs on the 750 MHz Alpha, we measured the timing results shown in Table 7.
Although the O(d
3
) space complexity of Satoh's algorithm grows quickly, the
tricks described in [FGH00] keep the constant factor small. With these tricks,
the largest key size we dealt with (571 bits) requires under 10 megabytes and
for moderate key sizes the memory usage was only a few hundred kilobytes. We
chose a dierent trade-o, using more memory in exchange for slightly higher
speed.
To investigate the possibility of generating curves in constrained environ-
ments, we ran some tests at 113 bits on an ARM chip. This small key size
is recommended for key-exchange in the Wireless Application Forum's WTLS
standard (WAP) and can be used for short-term security at a level comparable
to DES. The results can be seen in Table 8.
Field size Frequency Time to Average time to RAM + ROM used
count one curve nd a good curve
113 bits 275 MHz 5.9 s 38 s 240 KB + 136 KB
Table 8. Time to nd a good WAP curve on an ARM chip
Field size Time Field size Time Field size Time
157 bits 0.50 s 197 bits 0.91 s 283 bits 6.32 s
163 bits 0.56 s 233 bits 1.39 s 409 bits 19.4 s
193 bits 0.84 s 239 bits 1.47 s 571 bits 58.2 s
Table 9. New times for point-counting on a 750 MHz EV6 Alpha
6 Conclusion
The Satoh-FGH algorithm has proven to be the method of choice whenever one
wants to compute the cardinality of a random elliptic curve dened over a nite
eld of characteristic two. But in spite of Satoh-FGH's excellent performance
(see Table 4), the SEA algorithm should not be abandoned too quickly. In the
case of large characteristic it is the only practical method available. Moreover
the early-abort strategy, which is closely related to it, is valuable when looking
for a curve for cryptographic use, even in small characteristic. By combining this
technique and the Satoh-FGH algorithm, we obtain an eÆcient way of computing
secure curves (see Table 7). We conclude that it is no longer necessary to use
precomputed curves in cryptography since one can easily compute new curves as
desired. Finding a curve with a security level comparable with RSA-1024 takes
minutes or less. Curve generation for short-term security, with a level equivalent
to DES, is feasible on a low-power chip. Finally, very high security levels similar
to the highest AES level are now possible albeit in several hours.
Remark
We have recently implemented a new and quite dierent point-counting algo-
rithm with lower memory requirements and a gain in speed by a factor ranging
from 4 to 5 depending on key-size. For instance a secure 113-bit curve can be
found in 8 seconds using 36 KB of RAM on the 275 MHz StrongARM. Repeating
the calculations from Tables 4 and 7 gave the times in Table 9 and Table 10.
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Field size Average time to
(in bits) nd a good curve
157 5 s
163 5 s
193 10 s
197 10 s
233 21 s
239 22 s
283 138 s
409 7 min
571 34 min
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nd good curves (EV6 { 750 MHz)
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